Authored
by Brigadier John Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder is an important book in
understanding the Indian humiliation in Sino-Indian war of 1962 – the men who
were responsible for it, the deeply flawed policies, and the back ground
environment in which the possibility of war was slowly brewing. It’s a curtain
raiser to the Sino-Indian war; it’s the angry truth about India’s most crushing
military disaster – as proclaimed rightly in the cover page.
To
put it in simple terms, the defeat of India in the hands of Chinese was the
outcome of deeply flawed national policy; a policy that was guided from none
other than ‘pandit’ Nehru. That’s the genesis from where all other problem
emanates. It’s a refusal to acknowledge that there is a crises and that’s
needed to be responded to instead indulging in Ostrich-like behavior.
Annexation
of Tibet and aftermath –
Any
nation which has concerns for its national security cannot remain a mute
spectator to the events in its neighboring country. That’s what India chose to
do when China annexed Tibet in 1950. Tibet was like a buffer zone for India
against its enemies, vital to its strategic defense. India was always
considered secure in the North because of the mighty Himalayas which was
considered impregnable. But this impregnability was greatly compromised with
the annexation of Tibet. Sardar Patel wrote a prophetic letter to Nehru about
the Chinese problem in 1950, just one month before his death. Brig. Dalvi says
that letter deserves a place in any analysis of Sino-Indian war.
India
under Nehru was delusional about the imminent Chinese threat. It continued to
make believe that China was a good friend of India and there can never be any
was with China even though there might be minor differences. Instead of
assessing the problems in strategic and military viewpoint, India decided to
rest on hope – for which it had to pay dearly in 1962.
Lack
of direction, lack of leadership
As
mentioned earlier, India never acknowledged the imminent threat China posed let
alone develop a strategic response to it. When this is the case, we can’t
expect any serious preparation in the military ranks and files. Every decision
was taken on an ad-hoc basis; there was no serious long term strategic plan
whatsoever. Even though many military officers could see the cardinal disregard
for the military principle they were unable to do so owing to political
pressures.
But
on the other side, China was thoroughly prepared for any kinds of escalations –
in terms of manpower, transport, food supply etc. When the Chinese were
feverishly preparing for a possible invasion and combat, India was
dilly-dallying and hoping that nothing would happen. It was only when the
Chinese moved into the Indian Territory and occupied a portion of Ladakh, India
was alerted. Then, the military reactions begin – which was actually done to
pacify agitated public opinion, nothing more. India was giving bombastic
statements externally, but internally hoping everything would end peacefully.
This kind of dual aims or confused aims never give any proper directions to the
war.
With
lack of preparedness in all fronts, lacking any cohesive national policy,
lacking political leadership, having to confront a mighty enemy, Indian army –
which was once hailed as one of the best in the world was humiliated at the
hands of Chinese in October 1962 and had to concede thousands of square miles
which is not recovered till date. This was no fault of the army which actually fought
in the toughest of the terrains and with the mightiest of the enemies and with
bare minimum resources. Many (including the author) were taken as Prisoners of
War.
Brig.
Dalvi lists all the guilty men who were responsible for this debacle. It all
starts from Nehru, defense minister Menon, the ministry of defense et al. When
the confrontation happened, the two important people of the country – the PM,
and the defense ministers were not in the country tells tales how serious these
men were about the happenings in the country. Instead, Nehru was concerned
about the world problems and assumed the leadership position in NAM and
neglected the domestic and defense issues. After the death of Sardar Patel,
Nehru and his policies were virtually unchallenged and uncontested. This proved
to be detrimental.
The
war of 1962 was a rude awakening for India. It was a call to formulate a
realistic foreign policy. Brig. Dalvi sums it up as “1962 was a national failure of which every Indian is guilty. It was a
failure in higher direction of war, a failure of the opposition, a failure of
the general staff (myself included): it was a failure of responsible public
opinion and the press. For the government of India, it was a Himalayan Blunder
at all levels”
