Book Review - Himalayan Blunder

Authored by Brigadier John Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder is an important book in understanding the Indian humiliation in Sino-Indian war of 1962 – the men who were responsible for it, the deeply flawed policies, and the back ground environment in which the possibility of war was slowly brewing. It’s a curtain raiser to the Sino-Indian war; it’s the angry truth about India’s most crushing military disaster – as proclaimed rightly in the cover page. 

To put it in simple terms, the defeat of India in the hands of Chinese was the outcome of deeply flawed national policy; a policy that was guided from none other than ‘pandit’ Nehru. That’s the genesis from where all other problem emanates. It’s a refusal to acknowledge that there is a crises and that’s needed to be responded to instead indulging in Ostrich-like behavior.

Annexation of Tibet and aftermath –

Any nation which has concerns for its national security cannot remain a mute spectator to the events in its neighboring country. That’s what India chose to do when China annexed Tibet in 1950. Tibet was like a buffer zone for India against its enemies, vital to its strategic defense. India was always considered secure in the North because of the mighty Himalayas which was considered impregnable. But this impregnability was greatly compromised with the annexation of Tibet. Sardar Patel wrote a prophetic letter to Nehru about the Chinese problem in 1950, just one month before his death. Brig. Dalvi says that letter deserves a place in any analysis of Sino-Indian war.

India under Nehru was delusional about the imminent Chinese threat. It continued to make believe that China was a good friend of India and there can never be any was with China even though there might be minor differences. Instead of assessing the problems in strategic and military viewpoint, India decided to rest on hope – for which it had to pay dearly in 1962.

Lack of direction, lack of leadership

As mentioned earlier, India never acknowledged the imminent threat China posed let alone develop a strategic response to it. When this is the case, we can’t expect any serious preparation in the military ranks and files. Every decision was taken on an ad-hoc basis; there was no serious long term strategic plan whatsoever. Even though many military officers could see the cardinal disregard for the military principle they were unable to do so owing to political pressures.

But on the other side, China was thoroughly prepared for any kinds of escalations – in terms of manpower, transport, food supply etc. When the Chinese were feverishly preparing for a possible invasion and combat, India was dilly-dallying and hoping that nothing would happen. It was only when the Chinese moved into the Indian Territory and occupied a portion of Ladakh, India was alerted. Then, the military reactions begin – which was actually done to pacify agitated public opinion, nothing more. India was giving bombastic statements externally, but internally hoping everything would end peacefully. This kind of dual aims or confused aims never give any proper directions to the war.

With lack of preparedness in all fronts, lacking any cohesive national policy, lacking political leadership, having to confront a mighty enemy, Indian army – which was once hailed as one of the best in the world was humiliated at the hands of Chinese in October 1962 and had to concede thousands of square miles which is not recovered till date. This was no fault of the army which actually fought in the toughest of the terrains and with the mightiest of the enemies and with bare minimum resources. Many (including the author) were taken as Prisoners of War.

Brig. Dalvi lists all the guilty men who were responsible for this debacle. It all starts from Nehru, defense minister Menon, the ministry of defense et al. When the confrontation happened, the two important people of the country – the PM, and the defense ministers were not in the country tells tales how serious these men were about the happenings in the country. Instead, Nehru was concerned about the world problems and assumed the leadership position in NAM and neglected the domestic and defense issues. After the death of Sardar Patel, Nehru and his policies were virtually unchallenged and uncontested. This proved to be detrimental.

The war of 1962 was a rude awakening for India. It was a call to formulate a realistic foreign policy. Brig. Dalvi sums it up as “1962 was a national failure of which every Indian is guilty. It was a failure in higher direction of war, a failure of the opposition, a failure of the general staff (myself included): it was a failure of responsible public opinion and the press. For the government of India, it was a Himalayan Blunder at all levels”